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Abstract 
 
 
In this article, we analyze the dynamics of temporary workers’ transitions into permanent contracts for 
workers related to the tourism industry. For this purpose, we use an administrative retrospective dataset 
from Spanish Social security records. Results show that while individuals with a weaker attachment to the 
tourism industry achieve open-ended contracts sooner than in most other industries, on the contrary, it 
takes more time to those with a greater attachment to the tourism industry to exit from the temporary 
status. In addition, we find that for workers substantially engaged in the tourism industry, it takes more 
time to reach an open-ended contract when they have held between six and ten contracts in the past (as 
opposed to holding only one previous contract). On the contrary, for individuals with a weaker attachment 
to the tourism industry, holding between two and ten previous contracts implies a quicker exit from 
temporality. 
 
 
Keywords: Temporary employment; Temporality trap; Spanish tourism industry. 
JEL Classification: L83, J62, J64, C41 
 
 
 
                                                           
1
 Universidad de Salamanca. Departamento de Economía e Historia Económica. Edificio FES. Campus 
“Miguel de Unamuno” 37007. Salamanca. SPAIN. E-mail: malo@usal.es  
2
 Sección de Organización de Empresas. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.  C/ Madrid, 126. 28903 - 
Getafe (Madrid). SPAIN. E- mail: fernando.munoz@uc3m.es 
 1. Introduction 
Since the early 1960s, tourism has become the principal engine of growth in the services 
sector in Spain. According to the Spanish Statistical Office, tourism accounted for 12.1 
per cent of GDP in 2003 and employed around 12 per cent of the total workforce (and 
19 per cent of the service sector; see Guardia, 2004). It provides direct employment for 
over 860,000 people, rising to roughly 1.5 million workers when those employed in 
related activities are included (Corkhill et al., 2004). 
As many tourist activities are mainly seasonal, usually everybody assumes a direct link 
between the tourism industry and temporary and seasonal employment. In 2004, 32.8% 
of the sector’s employees were on temporary contracts in Spain, a figure which was 
slightly above the 31.2% national average, and four points larger than the service sector 
average of 28.4%. In fact, trade unions have called for greater job stability and less 
seasonal work in the tourism industry so as to achieve a service of greater quality 
(Jaimez, 2005). Thus, critics argue that the sustained growth in the tourism industry has 
been achieved at the expense of its workers. In spite of this, there have been surprisingly 
few attempts to evaluate the career progress in this industry, and, from our perspective, 
this is the main contribution of this article. 
Herein, we seek to contribute to the analysis of tourism employment by focusing on an 
important aspect of the use of temporary contracts in this industry: their pattern of 
promotion into open-ended contracts. In particular, we use a longitudinal administrative 
data source from the Spanish Social Security records (Muestra Continua de Vidas 
Laborales, hereinafter MCVL) which tracks the labor careers of workers affiliated in 
2005 (i.e., the sample is representative of working people in 2005 in Spain). The 
analysis of temp-to-perm transitions is carried out separately for workers in three 
different sub-samples. The first one is constituted by individuals who have never been 
 employed in the tourism industry along their labour market history; the second sub-
sample is formed by individuals who have been employed for less than 50 percent of 
their labour history in the tourism industry; the last sub-sample is composed of 
individuals who have been employed in the tourism industry at least for half of their 
working history. The objective is, therefore, to measure mobility into permanent 
contracts, by tracking the work biographies of these three different subsets of 
individuals. We estimate an econometric model in which the worker faces the 
alternative of remaining in the same situation characterized by the absence of an open-
ended contract versus moving to a permanent job. Our results show that when 
individuals have been employed in the tourism industry for less than 50 percent of their 
working life, tourism experiences represent a springboard into open-ended contracts. On 
the contrary, when individuals are substantially engaged in the tourism industry along 
their working life (i.e., those hired in the industry for at least 50 percent of their working 
life), being hired on a temporary basis in this industry exerts a negative impact as 
regards their career aspirations: these individuals enjoy a lower likelihood of achieving 
subsequent open-ended contracts. Thus, recursively working in the tourism industry —
which is characterized by seasonality, a large proportion of part-time workers and high 
labour turnover— implies limited career opportunities. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 addresses the institutional context and 
briefly reviews previous literature. Section 3 describes the data used. Section 4 presents 
the empirical model and its main results. We conclude in Section 5. 
2. Temp-to-perm transitions and the tourism industry:  Spanish institutional 
background and previous literature  
In general, the image of tourism employment appears to be split: on the one hand, 
tourism jobs possess a certain image of glamour —meeting people and travel are often 
 seen as glamorous and attractive aspects of tourism employment. On the other hand, 
they are deemed as of low status and skill. In a sense, the positive aspects attributed to 
tourism employment compete in the image stakes with negative aspects such as low 
pay, service and menial status. Some of the major touristic businesses are dominated by 
unskilled and semi-skilled jobs (Mathieson & Wall, 1982; Jafari et. al., 1990). The 
tourism employee is often seen as “uneducated, unmotivated, untrained, unskilled and 
unproductive” (Pizam, 1982, pp. 5). As regards Spain, the profile of a “typical” 
employee in hotels, catering and travel agencies is that of a woman aged 30 to 44 years-
old with secondary education, whereas the profile of a typical restaurant employee is 
that of a woman aged 16 to 29 years-old with elementary education (Jaimez, 2005), 
although some authors stress the relevance of the simultaneity of hard-to-fill vacancies 
and skill shortages in the Spanish tourism industry (Marchante et al., 2006).  
Tourism employment is characterized by high levels of fluctuation in demand for its 
services and products, not only in terms of annual seasonality, but also within the 
timeframe of a week or day. This causes labour to be flexible and makes it, in labour 
market terms, unstable (Ball, 1989; Riley, 1991; Heerschap, 2004). As labour flexibility 
is at the very heart of tourism employment, it is worth debating whether or not this can 
be counted as an attractive aspect of the industry. Tourism has a high degree of 
seasonality, which can generate a dichotomy between core-periphery workers, with 
employees in the periphery holding temporary contracts. Given the seasonal and 
periodic variations in demand in tourism, seasonal (Ball, 1989) and part-time work is 
common in the industry (Jafari et. al., 1990; International Labour Office, 1989). In 
Spain, the phenomenon of temporary employment in tourism affects women (43.6%) 
more than men (30.9%), and people under the age of 30 (56.8%), and some Spanish 
regions (in particular, Andalusia has a temporary employment rate in tourism of 42%). 
 Broken down by sub-sectors, we find that four out of every ten women employed in the 
hotel trade is hired on a temporary contract, this ratio dropping to three out of every ten 
for male workers. There is also a growing trend of temporary contracts in the 
restaurants, cafes and bars sectors, accounting for 48.1% of the female workers and 
39.9% of male ones (Spanish Labour Force Survey, INE).  
This predominance of seasonality and flexible working hours might harm career 
progress of workers in terms of reaching an open-ended contract compared to other 
economic sectors. The Spanish economy provides an interest context to contrast this 
hypothesis because Spain is the OECD country with the largest proportion of wage and 
salary workers hired on a temporary basis (around 30 percent since the beginning of the 
nineties). Although temporary contracts are widely used in the Spanish tourism industry 
(as we explained above), this type of contracts is extended to all economic sectors
1
. 
The extended use of temporary contracts in many sectors of activity in Spain began with 
a legal change introduced in the Workers’ Charter in 1984 aimed at decreasing the 
unemployment rate (at that time, the highest one in the OECD, above 20 percent). The 
main component of this labour market reform was to allow temporary and fixed-term 
contracts not only for temporary needs of the firm but also for permanent ones. 
Originally it was to increase hiring flexibility, but in fact it was an increase in firing 
flexibility, because of the much lower firing costs of temporary contracts compared to 
open-ended contracts. In very few years, the temporality rate rose from around 10 
percent at the beginning of the eighties (Fina et al., 1989) to around 33 percent in 1992 
(Toharia, 2006). Such high proportions of workers hired on a temporary basis created 
different problems for workers and even for firms and the economy as a whole (Toharia 
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 Sometimes, the high temporality rate of Spain has been related to the relative importance of tourism 
industries and construction. However, Toharia (2006) and Malo & Mato (2006) show (applying shift-
share analysis) that the widespread use of temporary contracts is not related to the employment 
 & Malo, 2002), such as higher working injury rates, lower levels of skills, decreases in 
the fertility rate, increasing difficulties faced by young people to obtain mortgages, 
relevant postponement of new families formation, and a segmented labour market. 
Different labour market reforms have been implemented in 1994, 1997, and 2006 in 
order to decrease the use of temporary contracts and to promote the conversion of these 
contracts into open-ended contracts. Theses reforms have not had a big short-term effect 
on the use of temporary contracts (in 2007 the temporality rate remained at 31 per cent), 
although the temporality rate has slightly decreased in the private sector
2
. 
Literature on transitions from temporary to permanent contracts mainly focuses on 
whether a ‘temporality trap’ exists or not. On the one hand, temporary employment may 
be a ‘trap’ of endless precariousness especially as duration in the temporary contract 
increases. First, a temporary contract may serve as a signal as to the lack of alternatives 
(especially in case that the employer believes that the temporary worker has already 
been screened by other employees). Second, due to the high turnover usually associated 
with fixed-term and temporary contracts, temporary work may be associated with 
limited acquisition of human capital (in the presence of a positive externality connecting 
specific to general human capital). Finally, as search intensity for an open-ended job is 
expected to decrease with the duration in the non-permanent state, the exit rate from a 
temporary to a permanent contract is expected to be negatively associated with such a 
duration. 
On the other hand, there are at least two reasons why temporary employment might 
represent a “springboard” to permanent employment (García-Pérez & Muñoz-Bullón, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
distribution by sectors and that, moreover, the evolution of the temporality rate is not linked to dynamic 
changes in the distribution of employment by industries. 
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 As Toharia (2005) explains the temporality rate in Spain has been high in the Public Administration at 
the local level, particularly in municipalities, possibly because local employment measures are strictly 
linked to the annual public budget and contracts can not go beyond this limit. Thus, some people are hired 
year by year by municipalities using different types of temporary and fixed-term contracts. 
 2007). First, according to the matching approach, firms may use temporary contracts as 
a screening device in order to identify the best matches: in this case, more-able workers 
might signal their type by making themselves available for screening under temporary 
contracts. In this sense, workers who are able to find a temporary job provide a signal of 
their quality to potential employers, since being on a temporary contract means that the 
worker is willing to take a job (rather than, for instance, rely on unemployment 
benefits). Therefore, temporary job experience may be informative about the ability and 
motivation of the individual
3
. We would then expect that the rate of transition from a 
temporary contract to an open-ended contract would decrease as time goes by, since 
employers will use an individual’s labor market history to sort good workers from bad 
workers and they might perceive (rightly or wrongly) that a previous history of multiple 
temporary contracts is likely to result in some loss of skills. Secondly, following the 
human capital approach, being employed under a temporary contract respect to being 
non-employed allows the worker the acquisition of human capital (either general or 
specific) which would positively influence the probability of acquiring a permanent 
status —in addition to social contacts and information on permanent vacancies, which 
may allow the individual to deepen his attachment to the labor market, and to search 
more effectively for more desirable jobs
4
.  
Therefore, the way in which the accumulation of temporary jobs affects the probability 
of reaching an open-ended contract is an empirical question. Previous international 
literature shows results supporting both views. Hagen (2003) for Germany, Zijl et al. 
(2004) for the Netherlands, Gagliarducci (2005) for Italy, and Engelland & Riphahn 
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 Indeed, some studies have shown that employers indeed use atypical contracts as a way of screening for 
permanent jobs (Storrie, 2002; Houseman et al., 2003). 
4
 However, as explained in the literature on career interruption (Mincer & Offek, 1982), unemployment 
spells following terminations of temporary contracts would make the individual incur not only the 
permanent loss of firm-specific human capital, but also the deterioration of general skills (Gregory et al., 
2001). 
 (2005) find evidence on temporary contracts as bridges towards permanent 
employment. However, Booth et al. (2002b) for the UK, D’Addio & Rosholm (2005) 
for the European Union
5
 as a whole, and Blanchard and Landier (2002), find relevant 
negative effects of temporary employment on labour careers. 
Focusing on the Spanish case, the first empirical analysis (up to our knowledge) is 
Toharia (1996), who finds that seniority is a key variable to determine the transition 
from a temporary contract to a permanent one, because employers would be interested 
in using, at least for some workers, temporary contracts to screen for candidates to 
permanent jobs. Later, Alba-Ramírez (1998) shows that the likelihood of a temp-to-
perm transition notably decreased from 1987 to 1995, especially for women, young 
people, males without studies and for those non-employed prior to their temporary 
contract. Again, seniority is a key variable to understand the transition toward an open-
ended contract
6
. Recently, Toharia & Cebrián (2007) have provided wide empirical 
evidence explicitly focused on whether or not a temporality trap exists. They use 
different databases to analyze workers’ labour market trajectories. A distinctive feature 
of this research is that they analyze the patterns of (un)stability not only focusing on the 
transition towards an open-ended contract but also on the stability of the open-ended 
contracts too. They find that after a period of 7 seven years (from 1998 to 2004) 39 
percent of temporary workers remain in a situation of vulnerability as regards the 
temporality trap. In addition, using a multivariate analysis they find that the strongest 
negative effect on the likelihood of being trapped is found for individuals with up to 5 
contracts. For additional contracts, the effect remains negative up to 20 contracts, 
becomes zero between 21 to 39 contracts and positive for 40 or more contracts. These 
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 They use the European Community Household Panel from 1994 to 1999. 
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 Using cross-section data from 2001 for Spain, García-Serrano (2004) shows that workers with 
temporary contracts suffer worse labour conditions and face a greater employment exit rate, especially 
those with tenure lower than 18 months. 
 three studies use logit specifications, which may be not very flexible when applied to 
the analysis of the dynamic path of transition rates. Up to our knowledge, duration 
studies on Spanish conversion rates are those of Amuedo-Dorantes (2000), Güell and 
Petrongolo (2005), Casquel & Cunyat (2005) and García-Pérez & Muñoz-Bullón 
(2007). Amuedo-Dorantes (2000) estimates transitions out of temporary employment 
using Labour Force Survey (LFS) data from 1995:2 through 1996:2, and finds that 
conversion rates are very low, regardless of job tenure. Güell & Petrongolo (2007) use 
LFS data from 1987:2 through 2002:4 to study the time pattern of permanent 
employment, and they find that conversion rates of temporary into permanent contracts 
increase with seniority. Casquel & Cunyat (2005) analyze whether the existence of 
observable and unobservable characteristics influences the transition rate to a permanent 
employment and conclude that in Spain temporary contracts do not play this role. 
García-Pérez & Muñoz-Bullón (2007) analyze temporary workers’ transitions into 
permanent employment for workers under 26 years-old. They find out that the 
conversion rate from temporary into permanent employment is very low, and that 
individuals with long unemployment duration flow into permanent work less frequently.  
Nevertheless, none of this previous research focuses on the employment in tourism 
industry, and this is one of the novelties of the present contribution. However, the 
instability of workers’ career in Spain is a worrying issue for policymakers. The main 
instrument provided by the institutional regulation is a special type of open-ended 
contract called ‘discontinuous open-ended contract’ (in Spanish, contrato fijo 
discontinuo). It is an open-ended contract which allows for interruptions of the labour 
relation because of seasonality. These interruptions (typically, in autumn and winter) are 
covered either by working elsewhere (for example, in construction) or by receiving 
public benefits for unemployment. In other words, when each tourist season ends, 
 workers are laid off but they expect an implicit re-call by the same firm in the following 
tourist season. In the Balearic Islands, this contract is widely used in the tourism 
industry
7
 (see Toharia, 2005, for a wide report on workers hired using these contracts). 
Considering that the employment variation in the Balearic Islands is around 100,000 
people, 40 percent is covered by these special open-ended contracts whereas the 
remainder is covered by different types of temporary and fixed-term contracts. As 
regards earnings, Toharia (2005) concludes that the discontinuous open-ended contract 
is not harmful for these workers. In our analysis, we will not consider this contract as a 
special case, because we will focus on the first transition into an open-ended contract. 
However, any analysis trying to cover the whole trajectory of workers in the tourism 
industry in Spain should consider as a special case the perm-temp or perm-
unemployment transitions from discontinuous open-ended contracts and the successive 
temp-to-perm contracts. 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Data and definition of sub-samples 
Our data set is a representative sample of all workers included in the Spanish Social 
Security records in 2005, and it is called Longitudinal Sample of Working Lives (in 
Spanish, Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL). For all these workers, the 
database includes information about their whole labour market trajectory, i.e., about 
every employment (and unemployment spell) along their work history (from the 
moment when they first enter the labor force up to the year 2005). Thus, it is a 
retrospective database not a panel. Because of this, every conclusion will apply to the 
Spanish working population in 2005. The variables included refer to the worker’s labor 
market trajectory and their individual characteristics, such as reasons for the end of each 
contract, province, economic activity sector, type of contract, whether the contract was 
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 In other Spanish regions, as Murcia, this contract is also widely used for seasonal agricultural activities. 
 signed with a temporary help agency for each spell of employment, as well as age, 
gender, occupation, duration in employment and in unemployment. The duration of the 
employment spells are built from the dates of the hiring and the end of the contract and 
it is measured in months. In addition, for our analysis, we also consider two aggregate 
variables at the regional and national level: the growth rate of the domestic product (i.e., 
a control for the business cycle) and the regional unemployment rate (i.e., a control for 
the local labor market situation). 
From the initial database we filter out workers above 55 years-old, and select only 
individuals who had a temporary contract at least twice in the period analyzed, whose 
initial contract was of a temporary nature, and who have exclusively been working at 
the General System of the Social Security (i.e., we exclude self-employed workers).  
The analysis of temp-to-perm transitions in the tourism industry is only meaningful 
when we can compare with the rest of economic sectors. As along their careers, workers 
can be hired by firms from different industries, we have divided the total sample into 
three groups: the first one is constituted by individuals who have never been employed 
in the tourism industry along their labour market history; the second group is formed by 
individuals who have been employed in the tourism industry for less than 50 percent of 
their labour history; and the third one is composed by individuals who have been hired 
in the tourism industry at least for half of their working history. Since the size of these 
groups is very large, we extracted random samples out of the first two —a 10% random 
sample of the individuals belonging to the first group, and a 20% random sample of the 
individuals belonging to the second group. The final group size is 12,847, 10,481 and 
10,949 individuals in the first, second and third sub-samples, respectively. 
For our analysis (and to simplify the analysis), we only focus on the first temp-to-perm 
transition (if any) of the working trajectory of individuals. For individuals never hired 
 under a permanent contract, our sample includes all their employment spells (all of them 
under temporary contracts). For those who enjoy any temp-to-perm transition, we will 
consider their first open-ended contract (and, therefore, every temporary contract prior 
to this first observed open-ended contract). Finally, spells ending in 2005 may be 
censored. Therefore, for the econometric analysis the sample consists of spells of 
temporary contracts that can end up either in another temporary contract, in an open-
ended contract, or are censored observations. In addition, when tenure in temporary 
contracts lasts beyond 40 months the observation is considered as censored (given the 
small number of observations beyond this duration), as well as individuals observed in 
the last temporary contract of their labour history. 
3.2. Variables  
We will consider different variables in order to control for both worker and job 
heterogeneity. We include controls for age, gender, nationality, qualification group
8
, 
whether the contract is with a temporary help agency, and the employees’ activity 
sector. As indicated above, we also include some aggregate variables such as the growth 
rate of the gross domestic product and the regional unemployment rate. In addition, we 
control for the duration (in months) of the non-permanent state by including a second-
order polynomial in log(t) —see section 4 below: the type of duration dependence might 
help understand the role of temporary contracts in the Spanish labour market. Finally, in 
order to gain flexibility in the specification of the duration dependence and to control 
for the role of institutional factors we also include several dummy variables that 
describe some specifics points in time: 6, 12, 18, 24 and 36. The first spikes are meant 
to capture short-run effects, while the longer ones are introduced to capture longer 
renewal dynamics for temporary workers which can be related to institutional factors 
(among other things). 
 Given that we want to test whether the type of the labour path influences the exit rate to 
a permanent contract, we also include a time dummy variable which collects the number 
of temporary contracts held by the individuals previous to the last observed employment 
spell. This last spell consists either of a permanent contract (for the case of uncensored 
observations) or a temporary contract (for censored observations). This variable allows 
quantifying the marginal effect of each new spell into the exit rate into permanent 
employment.  
3.3. Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics at the time of the first temporary contract 
considered. In the no-tourism sub-sample, workers are predominantly males, while 
slightly more women are present in the remainder sub-samples. Workers in the “≥50%-
tourism” sub-sample are slightly less likely to be under 45 years-old, although, on 
average, differences as regards age are not substantial on average among the three 
groups. In addition, while 10 percent of individuals belonging to the first sub-sample are 
hired via the intermediation of a temporary help agency, this only occurs for 6 percent 
of them in the third sub-sample. In addition, individuals in the first sub-sample are 
substantially more likely to have a high qualification level (as compared to the 
remainder groups) and to be working either in the financial institutions and business 
services or in the commerce sector. Note also how tenure in the first temporary contract 
considered is substantially larger in the first sub-sample (around 10 months) versus the 
other two (6 and 8 months, respectively).  
Table 3 shows the decomposition of the temporary contract types for each group 
considered. The following categories are taken into account: per task contract, casual 
contract, work-experience contract, training contract, interim contract, and a residual 
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 The specific categories within each qualification group are detailed in the Appendix, Table A.1. 
 category (named as “Other”)
9
. As can be observed, most of temporary contract spells 
are per task and casual contracts, while interim, work-experience and training contracts 
only account for a very small size of temporary contract spells. In particular, the former 
two categories constitute a marginal one in each sub-sample. Work-experience and 
training contracts are the ones having longer tenure, while interim, casual and per task 
are the shortest ones. Moreover, by looking at the first spell, the most remarkable 
finding is that the weight of the “Other” category substantially increases. As regards the 
“≥50%-Tourism” sub-sample, the per task contract category has a larger weight in the 
first spell considered when compared to the total number of spells (something which 
does not occur for the remainder two sub-samples). 
Finally, table 4 shows that at relatively short durations, temporary contracts are more 
likely to end up into another temporary contract. As duration proceeds, the probability 
of another temporary contract substantially reduces, while the chances of permanent 
employment increase (up to durations of 6 months)
10
. Therefore, the length of 
transitions from temporary contracts to open-ended contracts is longer than from 
temporary contracts into temporary contracts. This may imply that employers generally 
use temporary contracts as a probation period and that “good” matches (in terms of 
renewal into open-ended contract or temporary contract) last longer. 
A preliminary analysis using non-parametric estimation of the hazard rates (see Figure 
1) provides the time profile of the empirical hazard of the exit from a temporary to an 
open-ended contract. It shows the monthly empirical hazard functions from a non-
permanent position for each sub-sample (Kaplan-Meier estimates). These empirical 
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 See the Appendix (Table A.2) for definitions for each type of temporary contract. In order to know more 
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 This table shows evidence of some temporary contracts continuing beyond the legal limit of three 
years. This may be attributed either to the fact that there may be imperfect compliance by employers 
shortly after the three-year limit, or measurement error (see, in this respect, Güell & Petrongolo, 2007).  
 hazard functions collect the proportion of individuals leaving the temporary contract 
state at each moment in time, given that they have been temporarily employed until that 
moment (Lancaster, 1990). The figure shows, in the first place, long durations in non-
permanent positions. In the second place, the probability of getting an open-ended 
contract remains basically flat, i.e, reaching a permanent contract is not related with the 
duration of the previous temporary contract. Therefore, the descriptive empirical 
evidence does not support the existence of a temporality trap level (in any of the three 
considered groups). Moreover, although the time profile is the same for the three 
groups, the rate is higher for those who have been working in this industry for at least 
fifty-percent of their working life (especially during the first twelve months), while the 
difference with respect to the other two sub-groups decreases with the duration of the 
temporary contract. Finally, it is noteworthy that there are several periods where the 
empirical hazard is noticeably higher than at surrounding periods: the hazard rates rise 
to peaks at tenure durations multiple of six (months 6, 12, 24 and 36). These peaks show 
that temporary contracts are very likely to finish at each of these particular months. 
Given that no special reason can be adduced to explain why individuals should be 
dismissed at those months multiple of six, these duration effects are likely due to 
temporary contract terminations. Similar results are obtained in previous studies (see, in 
particular, García-Pérez & Muñoz-Bullón, 2005, or Güell & Petrongolo, 2005). 
4. Econometric approach: discrete-time duration analysis 
The exit rates from employment are analysed using discrete hazard model techniques —
see Allison (1982) or Jenkins (1997), for a survey. The hazard rate out of employment 
into a permanent contract may be defined as the limit of the conditional probability of a 
transition taking place in a small interval dt after time t if no transition occurs until t, 
when that interval approaches to zero. Formally, let Ti be the length of individual i's 
 temporary contract spell. Then the hazard for individual i at time t, hi(t), is defined by 
the following equation:  
{ } idtiii tXh θβλθ '(t)X(t)exp
dt
t)T¦tTdttPr(
lim)),(,t( i0
ii
0i =
≥≥>+
= →  (1) 
where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard function which may take a parametric or non-
parametric form; Xi(t) is a vector of time-invariant and time-varying covariates for 
individual i, β is the vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, i=1…N are 
individual-month observations, and, finally, θi captures unobserved individual 
characteristics that affect the hazard in theory but are unobservable in the data, such as  
acquired skills, attitudes, motivation, inherent ability and so on.  
Now, we define the probability of surviving through any interval dt after having 
survived the preceding j interval as (1-hij). Therefore, the likelihood contribution of 
individuals who exit into a permanent contract in the j-th interval is
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and if we assume that censoring takes place at the beginning of intervals, the likelihood 
contribution of individuals who find another temporary contract (or are artificially 
censored) at the start of the jth interval is: 
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Then, defining di=1 if individual i's spell ends in a transition to a job (0 otherwise), the 
likelihood contribution of the i's individual can be written as: 
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 where the discrete time hazard in the jth interval for each individual is: 
[ ])(t)γ(t)X exp(exp1h itij θβ ++−−=     (5) 
A common but restrictive approach consists of specifying a parametric form for the 
baseline hazard (γt(t)). This approach is rather strong, given that the assumptions over 
the form are difficult to justify from an economic point of view, and provokes a 
misspecification problem. Instead of this, duration dependence is captured through the 
additive term γt(t), which is estimated in the most general way as possible through the 
inclusion of a second-order polynomial in log(t)
12
. This method presents the advantage 
of being flexible and it is very common in the literature (see García-Pérez, 1997; 
García-Pérez & Muñoz-Bullón, 2005). A common distribution used for unobserved 
heterogeneity is the gamma distribution (Meyer, 1990). It can be shown that when θ is 
gamma distributed with unit mean and variance σ2, the log-likelihood function becomes 
as follows (Meyer, 1990, pp. 770)
13
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 (6) 
where γ(t) is a function that describes duration dependence in the hazard rate through 
the inclusion of a polynomial in log(t); and di is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
individual i´s spell ends in a transition to employment and 0 otherwise (censored 
observations). In the next section we estimate this likelihood function by maximum 
likelihood to ascertain which personal, job and labour market characteristics influence 
                                                                                                                                                                          
11
 We omit t, X and θ to simplify notation. 
12
 This polynomial offers the best results in terms of significance and likelihood values. 
13
 The choice of a gamma distribution is made for computational reasons, which, however, could be 
debatable (Narendranathan & Stewart, 1993). Alternatively, the distribution could be approximated non-
parametrically (Heckman & Singer, 1984).  That is, we might follow a semi-parametric approach based 
on Heckman & Singer (1984), where it would be assumed that unobserved heterogeneity followed a 
discrete distribution function with different mass points.  
 the duration of spells of temporary contracts that end either in an open-ended or in 
another temporary contract. 
5. Results: the transition rate into permanent employment  
Table 5 reports the results obtained from an estimation of the hazard rates for each sub-
sample
14
. Censoring (as explained earlier) takes place when some individuals are not 
observed prior to failure. In the present case, the data are right-censored because we do 
not observe the transition out of temporary employment for some individuals in the 
sample (they either continue at their current temporary job or enter a new temporary 
job). Moreover, as commented in Section 3.1, we have created an artificial right-
censoring beyond 40 months, due to the scarcity of observations beyond this duration. 
Therefore, the hazard model is used to examine the likelihood that workers exit 
temporary employment and enter permanent employment (versus entering a new 
temporary job or continuing at the current temporary job). Since Kaplan-Meier 
estimates for the employment hazard indicate that the likelihood of exiting from 
employment is significantly higher at the sixth, twelfth, twenty-fourth and thirty-sixth 
months
15
 (see Section 3.3), the specification of the hazard rate includes dummy 
variables indicating whether or not the individual is on-the-job at such months
16
. 
Given that our main interest is on the impact arising from the tourism industry on the 
likelihood of achieving permanent contracts, we have included a set of dummies which 
collect the activity sector where the individual is employed under the temporary 
contracts considered
17
. For workers in the ≥50%-tourism sub-sample, the most notable 
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 Though not shown, separate estimations by gender have also been obtained. They are available from 
the authors upon request. 
15
 Other studies (see, for instance, García-Pérez & Muñoz-Bullón, 2005) also show evidence in this 
respect. 
16
 The ratio of the hazard rate of an individual with a dummy variable equal to 1 to the hazard rate of the 
reference is exp(b). The percentage of increment (detriment) in the hazard rate is calculated as (exp(b)- 
1)*100.  
17
 Of course, for the group of workers never hired by tourism industry the set of industry dummies of the 
temporary contract does not include tourism. For those individuals without experience in the tourism 
 result is the fact that the tourism industry experience implies a substantial detrimental 
effect on the transition into a permanent contract, a decrease in the hazard rate of 45.3 
per cent, respect to the remainder sectors (with the exception of Public Administration). 
Individuals with less than 50% of their labour history in the tourism industry enjoy a 
higher likelihood of achieving a permanent job when the temporary contract is in the 
tourism industry (an increase of 85.5 per cent in the hazard ratio) respect to the 
remainder sectors (with the exception of the residual group of ‘Other services’). 
Therefore, a tourism temporary contract might be either beneficial or detrimental, 
depending on the degree of attachment of the workers’ career to such an industry: for 
those with a weaker attachment, such an experience will serve as a ‘springboard’ into 
permanent employment, whereas for those heavily engaged in tourism will be a 
substantial difficulty for moving into a permanent position. 
It is important to notice that individual background previous to the current temporary 
contract spell is relevant for explaining the transitions across labor careers and it is a 
good approach to determine whether a ‘temporality trap’ exists or not. In particular, for 
the non-tourism group, the chance of transiting into a permanent job reduces as the 
number of previous contracts is larger (-39.7 per cent for 2-5 previous temporary 
contracts, -65 per cent for 6-10 contracts, -71.8 per cent for more than 10 contracts). 
This negative effect also appears in the ≥50%-tourism sub-group, although it is only 
significant for having 6 to 10 previous temporary contracts (a decrease in the hazard rate 
of 39 per cent). Therefore, the results show the existence of a temporality trap for non-
tourism workers and a ‘partial’ trap for those with a working career mainly developed in 
the tourism industry. On the contrary, experiences of several previous temporary 
                                                                                                                                                                          
industry along their work history, holding a temporary contract in the commerce, in agriculture, in the 
fishing or extractive industries or in the financial institutions and business services sectors, makes them 
enjoy a higher likelihood of entering regular employment than in the production sector. On the contrary, 
 contracts exert a positive significant influence on the likelihood of transiting into a 
permanent job in the <50%-tourism sub-sample, up to a total of ten previous contracts 
(an increase in the hazard rate of 86.1 per cent for 2-5 contracts and of 91 per cent for 6-
10 contracts). Again, we find a positive effect of temporary contracts on their prospects 
of reaching a permanent job for those occasionally engaged in tourism. 
The variables for tenure in temporary contracts (6, 12, 18, 24, and 36 months) have a 
positive and very significant effect on the hazard rates, independently of the sub-sample 
considered. Therefore, as expected, temporary contracts are more likely to end at integer 
monthly durations. An eventual interpretation is that firms may be converting temporary 
contracts into permanent ones, once the legal limit for the temporary contract has been 
reached. Moreover, the hazard at durations multiple of six is higher for individuals who 
have been employed for more than half of their working history in the tourism industry 
than for the sub-group where individuals have been employed in this industry for at 
least 5 percent of their working lives. The fact that the time pattern of transitions into 
permanent contracts is lower for those with a higher attachment to the tourism industry 
may imply either that the latter tend to occupy less productive job matches (which are 
thus less likely to be converted into permanent ones before the legal limit) or that they 
are in a weaker bargaining position than individuals in other industries, as they may be 
more easily replaced. 
However, when the employer in the current temporary contract is the same as in the 
previous one, the probability of reaching an open-ended contract decreases, -28.2 per 
cent for non-tourism workers, and -56.6 per cent for the <50% -tourism sub-sample. 
These results show that employers do not use temporary contracts as screening devices 
                                                                                                                                                                          
worse expectations as regards the exiting from temporary positions arise in construction, public 
administration and in teaching and health activities. 
 when they subsequently hire the same workers through temporary contracts. 
Nevertheless, results do not show this effect for the >50%-tourism sub-sample. 
One might expect that workers who accept a temporary job are initially strongly 
attached to that job, for instance, for contractual reasons. In some sense, this is true, 
since the negative estimated effect for duration dependence is reversed as tenure in the 
temporary job increases. In particular, the predicted transition into regular employment 
slightly increases after a period of ten months 
 
(a similar finding is obtained by Zijl et 
al., 2004). This effect applies to the three sub-samples of workers: the probability of 
finding a permanent contract decreases during the initial months of temporary 
employment, but increases thereafter. Thus, temporary employment duration initially 
presents a temporary penalty effect, since this negative impact disappears for long 
enough employment durations. A likely interpretation for this result is that sufficiently 
long experiences of employment increase worker’s human capital, and this fact may 
help her find a permanent job (compared to workers whose tenure in temporary 
employment is shorter). Apparently, employers may prefer individuals who have 
occupied a temporary job for time enough, given that this may constitute a positive 
signal. An increasing size of the social network among temporarily employed workers 
may also explain this. In addition, as the temporary contract goes on, given its fixed-
term nature, the worker may increase search intensity. This may also explain the 
observed positive effect on the job finding rate. 
For a female temporary worker the probability of achieving a permanent contract does 
not significantly differ from that of men either in the ≥50%-tourism group or in the 
<50%-tourism sub-sample, while they are in a disadvantaged position (relative to men) 
in the non-tourism group. Age has a positive effect on the likelihood of transiting from 
temporary contracts into an open-ended contract, though only for the 25 to 35 age 
 category in the no-tourism sub-sample. Thus, individuals in the 25-35 age groups are 
more likely to enter into permanent employment. Probably, these workers have more 
firm-specific human capital than the youngest ones, which is highly valued by 
employers. In addition, it is a fact that younger workers are more willing to move from 
jobs (and employers) for improving their job match, even though this may imply an 
experience of unemployment, and eventually settling in a more stable career path 
(Jensen et al., 2003). In addition, the type of temporary contract held in the temporary 
contract spell is another relevant determinant of the transitions. Having an interim 
contract increases the probability of achieving a permanent contract. On the other 
extreme, we find training and work experience contracts, which present a detrimental 
effect on the movement into regular employment.  
As regards macroeconomic conditions, out of a temporary contract spell, the 
unemployment rate has a negative impact on the transitions into an open-ended contract. 
Thus, when the unemployment rate is high, firms can keep on searching for better 
employees and so the probabilities that a worker is renewed or converted into a 
permanent job are lower. A lower unemployment implies better outside opportunities 
for temporary workers in search for better jobs, and this enables them to more credibly 
threat their employer in case of low conversion rates. On the contrary, the effect of the 
GDP growth rate is mostly non-significant. There are some differences as regards the 
region of residence. In the no-tourism sub-sample, compared to Madrid, it is workers in 
Galicia, Cantabria, Asturias and Aragon who are substantially less likely to achieve a 
permanent contract. On the contrary, in the remainder groups, Balearic Islands is the 
region where exiting from employment into regular work is more difficult (which is one 
of the most important regions as regards tourism employment), closely followed by 
Murcia and Valencia (where tourism is very relevant too). Anyway, being in the 
 Balearic Islands heavily decreases the probability of transiting towards a permanent 
employment either for those with a large or weak attachment to the tourism sector (in 
both cases, the hazard rate decreases in around 88 per cent). 
Finally, one should note that the size of the gamma mixture distribution relative to its 
standard error suggests that unobserved heterogeneity is significant in this dataset. Thus, 
unobserved individual heterogeneity would be a serious concern without the 
methodological approach of this econometric estimation.  
6. Summary and conclusions 
While academics and tourism planners have recognized that community involvement in 
tourism is essential —and, as a result, tourism is promoted in policy agendas on the 
grounds that it will enhance the lives of local people— limited attention has been paid 
to the stability of the jobs created in this sector. This article has addressed the relative 
neglect (as compared, for example, with infrastructure, transportation or marketing) of 
career progress in the tourism industry. In particular, we have investigated how 
temporary contracts affect the transition rate into permanent employment in Spain. Our 
focus has been especially placed on a comparison between a sub-group of individuals 
with a large attachment to the tourism industry (more than the 50 per cent of the 
working career in tourism) versus two other sub-groups where this attachment is either 
non-existent or low (strictly zero and below 50 per cent, respectively). For this purpose, 
we have applied single-spell duration techniques to a longitudinal data set of temporary 
workers obtained from Social Security records, which is representative of Spanish 
working population in 2005 (and, therefore, the information about working lives is 
retrospective). We have focused our analysis on the transition (if any) to the first open-
ended contract of all individuals for the three described sub-samples.  
 Two main conclusions from the data analysis are drawn. First, for those individuals with 
a weaker attachment to the tourism industry (below the 50 percent of their working 
career) a temporary contract in the tourism industry increases around 85 per cent the 
likelihood of obtaining an open-ended contract, while for those with at least 50 percent 
of their working career in tourism a temporary contract in the tourism industry 
decreases the same probability by 45 percent. Therefore, temporary contracts in tourism 
are not harmful for career stabilization prospects when working in tourism industry is 
occasional but it is clearly detrimental when the worker is very linked to this economic 
sector. 
Second, the analysis supports the existence of a ‘temporality trap’ for Spain (in this line 
see Güell & Petrongolo, 2007, or García-Pérez & Muñoz-Bullón, 2007, and partially, 
Toharia & Cebrián, 2007): even though transitions into permanent employment increase 
with tenure, temporary jobs do not constitute stepping stones towards permanent 
employment since the probability of obtaining a permanent job decreases with repeated 
temporary jobs. However, this result depends on the relative attachment to specific 
sectors (here, the tourism industry) of the working careers of individuals. For those 
workers with an occasional engagement in the tourism industry temporary contracts 
(and even accumulating temporary contracts) are, on the contrary, ‘springboards’ 
towards open-ended contracts. 
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 APPENDIX 
TABLE A.1. Aggregation of Social Security Contribution Groups into skills levels 
Skills Level Description of corresponding Social Security Contribution Groups 
High 1- ingenieros and licenciados - engineers and graduates 
2- ingenieros técnicos, peritos and ayudantes titulados - technical 
engineers and other skilled workers 
3- jefes administrativos and de taller - chief and departmental heads 
Upper 
Intermediate 
4 - ayudantes no titulados - other semi-skilled workers 
5 - oficiales administrativos - skilled clerks 
6 - subalternos - auxiliary workers 
Lower-
Intermediate 
7 - auxiliares administrativos - semi-skilled clerks 
8 - oficiales de primera and segunda - skilled laborers 
Low 9 - oficiales de tercera and especialistas - semi-skilled laborers 
10 - peones - unskilled laborers 
Note: These groups are proxies for workers’ skills level, because these categories are a mix of occupation 
and educational level required for jobs. 
 
Table A.2. Description of Work Contract Denominations Used in the Analysis 
 
Work Contract Name Description 
Work-Experience 
(Practice) Contract 
(Contrato de prácticas) 
The purpose of this contract is to enable persons who have 
completed secondary, vocational training or university education 
to gain work experience according to their educational level. 
Training Contract 
(Contrato de formación) 
This contract is related to the provision of theoretical and 
practical knowledge required to perform a skilled job. This 
contract replaced the old apprenticeship contract in 1997. 
Interim Contract 
(Contrato de interinidad) 
This temporary contract is related to interim situations in the firm 
Per-task Contract 
(Contrato de obra o 
servicio) 
This contract was introduced for temporary needs of the firms 
related to specific works or services of unknown duration (but 
presumably not permanent). 
Casual Contract 
(Contrato eventual por 
circunstancias de la 
producción) 
This contract is related to unusual or seasonal circumstances of 
the goods markets and excess of work in the firm. 
 Figure 1. Exit rate to an open-ended contract (Kaplan-Meier), by sub-samples. 
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Table 1. Total visitor numbers, 1973-2001 (millions) 
 
1973 34.6 1979 39.0 1985 43.2 1991 53.5 1997 62.4 
1974 30.3 1980 38.0 1986 47.4 1992 55.3 1998 67.8 
1975 30.1 1981 40.1 1987 50.5 1993 57.3 1999 72.1 
1976 30.1 1982 42.0 1988 54.2 1994 61.2 2000 74.5 
1977 30.1 1983 41.3 1989 54.1 1995 64.5 2001 75.7 
1978 34.3 1984 43.0 1990 53.0 1996 57.3   
Note: Includes tourists and day visitors. Source: Corkhill et. al. (2004). 
 
 Table 2. Main descriptive statistics for the first temporary contract spell 
 
 No tourism < 50% in Tourism ≥ 50% in Tourism 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Sex (Male=1) 0.528 0.499 0.482 0.500 0.475 0.499 
Age:       
Age 16-25 0.738 0.440 0.832 0.374 0.648 0.478 
Age 25-35 0.200 0.400 0.124 0.330 0.234 0.423 
Age 36-45 0.045 0.207 0.034 0.181 0.086 0.281 
Age > 45 0.017 0.130 0.010 0.101 0.032 0.177 
Temporary Hep Agency (1=Yes) 0.100 0.300 0.080 0.271 0.058 0.234 
Qualification level:       
High 0.077 0.267 0.015 0.120 0.016 0.126 
Upper-intermediate 0.098 0.297 0.087 0.282 0.093 0.291 
Lower-intermediate 0.260 0.439 0.233 0.422 0.281 0.449 
Low 0.565 0.496 0.666 0.472 0.610 0.488 
Inmigrant (1=Yes) 0.092 0.288 0.105 0.306 0.279 0.449 
Employer equal to previous one (1=Yes) 0.380 0.486 0.264 0.441 0.366 0.482 
Type of temporary contract:       
Per task 0.263 0.440 0.171 0.377 0.153 0.360 
Casual 0.315 0.465 0.364 0.481 0.467 0.499 
Work-experience 0.041 0.198 0.009 0.097 0.012 0.110 
Training 0.031 0.175 0.040 0.195 0.023 0.149 
Interim 0.045 0.208 0.019 0.138 0.024 0.154 
Other 0.305 0.460 0.396 0.489 0.321 0.467 
Activity:       
Agriculture, Fishing and Extractive industries 0.011 0.104 0.006 0.079 0.004 0.061 
Production 0.148 0.355 0.063 0.242 0.032 0.176 
Energy and Transport 0.013 0.115 0.010 0.101 0.007 0.086 
Construction 0.137 0.344 0.047 0.211 0.027 0.163 
Commerce 0.229 0.421 0.144 0.351 0.088 0.283 
Tourism - - 0.456 0.498 0.672 0.469 
Financial institute. & business services 0.271 0.444 0.177 0.382 0.119 0.324 
Public Administration 0.040 0.196 0.021 0.142 0.012 0.107 
Teaching and Health 0.075 0.263 0.024 0.154 0.014 0.116 
Other services 0.076 0.265 0.051 0.220 0.026 0.158 
Duration of first temporary contract spell  (in months)* 10.403 9.885 5.616 7.367 7.826 8.200 
 
 Table 2. Main descriptive statistics (Cont.) 
 
 No tourism < 50% in Tourism ≥ 50% in Tourism 
Type of transition Temporary Open-ended Temporary Open-ended Temporary Open-ended 
Region:       
Andalucia 0.161 0.368 0.153 0.360 0.160 0.367 
Aragon 0.029 0.169 0.026 0.158 0.023 0.149 
Asturias 0.023 0.151 0.024 0.153 0.023 0.151 
Balearic Islands 0.018 0.133 0.045 0.208 0.062 0.241 
Canary Islands 0.043 0.202 0.061 0.240 0.102 0.303 
Cantabria 0.012 0.109 0.015 0.123 0.014 0.118 
Castilla la Mancha 0.039 0.194 0.027 0.162 0.022 0.146 
Castilla León 0.049 0.216 0.047 0.211 0.043 0.203 
Catalonia 0.174 0.380 0.196 0.397 0.160 0.366 
Valencia 0.102 0.303 0.106 0.308 0.095 0.293 
Extremadura 0.017 0.129 0.011 0.104 0.010 0.100 
Galicia 0.062 0.240 0.054 0.226 0.055 0.227 
Madrid 0.165 0.372 0.149 0.356 0.150 0.357 
Murcia 0.028 0.165 0.024 0.153 0.023 0.149 
Navarra 0.015 0.120 0.014 0.118 0.009 0.097 
Basque Country 0.057 0.231 0.043 0.202 0.042 0.200 
La Rioja 0.006 0.076 0.006 0.075 0.007 0.082 
No. Individuals 12,847   10,481 10,949 
Notes: (*) without taking into account censored observations. 
 Table 3. Temporary contract spells composition by sub-samples 
 
 n. of 
spells 
% Mean length % in first spell 
No tourism  
Type of contract     
Per task 29.481 35.88      4.140 (3.483) 26.27 
Casual 27.984   34.06      2.923 (2.749) 31.51 
Work-experience 1.693 2.06      10.709 (10.469) 4.09 
Training 753 0.92      8.422 (8.420) 3.14 
Interim 8.721 10.61      2.389 (1.915) 4.52 
Other 13.538 16.48      5.653 (5.234) 30.46 
<50% in Tourism  
Type of contract     
Per task 25.804 27.31      2.885 (2.575) 17.10 
Casual 44.007 46.57      2.302 (2.177) 36.45 
Work-experience 653 0.69      9.914 (9.106) 0.94 
Training 883 0.93      6.192 (6.204) 3.97 
Interim 6.519 6.90      1.881 (1.628) 1.95 
Other 16.624 17.59      3.719 (3.608) 39.60 
≥ 50% in Tourism  
Type of contract     
Per task 10.099 8.00 4.880 (4.1855) 15.33 
Casual 29.670 52.89 3.655 (3.4437) 46.68 
Work-experience 414 0.74 10.789 (10.580) 1.22 
Training 443 0.79 8.0744 (8.0744) 2.27 
Interim 2.826 5.04 2.6535 (2.1591) 2.43 
Other 12.648 22.55 5.500 (5.1572) 32.07 
 
Note: sample size is  12,847 individuals, 10,481 individuals and 10,949 individuals for the “No-
tourism”, the “<50%-Tourism” and the “≥50%-Tourism” sub-samples, respectively. All 
individuals’ first spell is temporary. “Median length” measured in months, in parentheses for 
complete spells only. 
 
 Table 4. Length of spell (in months) by type of transition  
 
 
 No tourism 
Spell Length: TC-TC TC-PC 
 n. % n. % 
≤1  43,707 63.05 1,604 25.46 
>1 & ≤3 9,763 14.08 1,071 17.00 
>3 & ≤6 7,501 10.82 1,306 20.73 
>6 & ≤12 5,522 7.97 1,220 19.37 
>12 & ≤18 1,314 1.90 440 6.99 
>18 & ≤24 823 1.19 406 6.45 
>24 & ≤30 262 0.38 95 1.51 
>30 & ≤36 240 0.35 137 2.17 
>36 191 0.28 20 0.32 
Total: 69,323 100.00 6,299 100.00 
Censored 6548 
 <50% in Tourism 
Spell Length: TC-TC TC-PC 
 n. % n. % 
≤1  57,690 68.67 2,134 39.42 
>1 & ≤3 11,972 14.25 1,041 19.23 
>3 & ≤6 8,015 9.54 1,053 19.45 
>6 & ≤12 4,680 5.57 799 14.76 
>12 & ≤18 885 1.05 184 3.40 
>18 & ≤24 423 0.50 122 2.25 
>24 & ≤30 138 0.16 29 0.54 
>30 & ≤36 119 0.14 45 0.83 
>36 87 0.10 7 0.13 
Total: 84,009 100.00 5,414 100.00 
Censored: 5067 
 ≥ 50% in Tourism 
Spell Length: TC-TC TC-PC 
 n. % n. % 
≤1  23494 52.03       2,102 26.31 
>1 & ≤3 7465 16.53       1,403      17.56 
>3 & ≤6 7,463 16.53 2,013 25.20 
>6 & ≤12 5,200 11.52 1,655 20.72 
>12 & ≤18 710 1.57 335 4.19 
>18 & ≤24 384 0.85 289 3.62 
>24 & ≤30 143 0.32 63 0.79 
>30 & ≤36 146 0.32 116 1.45 
>36 146 0.32 13 0.16 
Total: 45,151 100.00 7,989  
Censored 2,960 
 
  Table 5. Estimation results for discrete-time model of transitions from a temporary 
contract to an open-ended contract, by sub-samples (controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity). 
 No tourism ≥ 50% in Tourism < 50% in Tourism 
 Coef. Std. Signif. Coef. Std. Signif. Coef. Std. Signif. 
Log(t) -0.567 0.109 *** -0.971 0.120 *** -0.139 0.204  
Log(t)
2
 1.089 0.090 *** 1.859 0.102 *** 2.626 0.248 *** 
Month 6 1.163 0.063 *** 0.924 0.059 *** 1.011 0.114 *** 
Month 12 1.310 0.078 *** 1.303 0.101 *** 1.119 0.147 *** 
Month 18 0.819 0.121 *** 0.949 0.155 *** 1.003 0.283 *** 
Month 24 2.598 0.113 *** 2.924 0.165 *** 3.030 0.298 *** 
Month 36 3.051 0.208 *** 3.115 0.271 *** 3.246 0.506 *** 
Sex (1=male) -0.211 0.123 * 0.093 0.138  -0.066 0.258  
Age:          
Age 16-25 - - - - -  - - - 
Age 25-35 0.305 0.120 *** 0.075 0.145  -0.335 0.264  
Age 36-45 -0.079 0.266  0.287 0.235  0.311 0.630  
Age > 45 0.322 0.412  0.364 0.350  1.747 1.263  
Qualification level:          
High -0.069 0.197  0.367 0.377  0.028 0.495  
Upper-intermediate 0.416 0.138 *** -0.347 0.162  0.016 0.226  
Lower-intermediate 0.382 0.103 *** -0.135 0.103  0.053 0.155  
Low - - - - -  - -  
Inmigrant -0.208 0.226  0.386 0.175  0.059 0.457  
Regional unemployment rate (tvc) -0.036 0.012 *** -0.159 0.015 *** -0.089 0.022 *** 
Quarterly growth GDP (tvc) -0.025 0.021  -0.046 0.025 * -0.023 0.039  
Employer equal to previous one -0.331 0.085 *** -0.018 0.087  -0.834 0.132 *** 
Activity:          
Agriculture. Fishing and Extractive 
industries -0.048 0.366  -0.519 1.033  -1.334 0.998  
Production - - - - - - - -  
Construction -0.791 0.181  0.461 0.360  0.069 0.414  
Commerce 0.335 0.139 *** 0.152 0.283  0.431 0.299  
Tourism - - - -0.603 0.252 ** 0.618 0.277 ** 
Energy and Transport 0.066 0.346  -0.737 0.647  0.484 0.613  
Financial institutions and business 
services 0.240 0.154  0.268 0.294  0.286 0.333  
Public Administration -1.016 0.285 *** 1.055 0.553 * -0.376 0.747  
Teaching and Health -0.552 0.225 ** 0.214 0.472  -0.290 0.497  
Other services 0.068 0.194  0.258 0.348  0.688 0.383 * 
Number of previous Contracts:          
One contract - - - - - - - -  
2-5 contracts -0.506 0.086 *** -0.103 0.092  0.621 0.178 *** 
6-10 contracts -1.051 0.158 *** -0.494 0.182 *** 0.647 0.309 ** 
>10 contracts -1.267 0.222 *** -0.308 0.282  -0.121 0.394  
Type of contract:          
Per task -0.246 0.192  -0.933 0.237 *** -0.183 0.358  
Casual 0.284 0.184  -0.465 0.220 ** -0.095 0.347  
Work-experience -0.615 0.261 ** -2.960 0.494 *** -1.249 0.669 * 
Training -1.474 0.394 *** -1.595 0.447 *** -0.975 0.549 * 
Interim - - - - - - - - - 
Other -0.573 0.200 *** -1.214 0.236 *** -0.679 0.364 * 
Temporary Help Agency 0.119 0.154  -0.249 0.227  0.117 0.279  
  
Table 5 — Cont. 
 
 No tourism ≥ 50% in Tourism < 50% in Tourism 
 Coef. Std. Signif. Coef. Std. Signif. Coef. Std. Signif. 
Region:          
Andalucia -0.936 0.235 *** 0.258 0.283  -0.526 0.472  
Aragon -1.145 0.370 *** -0.981 0.439 ** -1.416 0.677 ** 
Asturias -1.307 0.406 *** -0.447 0.421  -0.679 0.710  
Balearic Islands -0.054 0.423  -2.093 0.303 *** -2.146 0.577 *** 
Canary Islands -0.523 0.287 * -0.702 0.262 *** -0.602 0.513  
Cantabria -1.256 0.550 ** 0.231 0.543  0.153 0.906  
Castilla la Mancha -0.508 0.293  -0.013 0.446  -0.427 0.631  
Castilla León -0.711 0.276 *** 0.330 0.337  0.002 0.595  
Catalonia -0.229 0.177  -0.743 0.224 *** -0.417 0.343  
Valencia -0.556 0.212 *** -0.802 0.263 *** -1.137 0.411 *** 
Extremadura -0.546 0.447  0.620 0.702  -0.873 1.079  
Galicia -1.751 0.282 *** -0.443 0.332  -0.556 0.573  
Madrid - - - - - - - - - 
Murcia -0.044 0.353  -0.874 0.514 * -1.895 0.797 ** 
Navarra -0.625 0.464  -0.949 0.678  -1.756 1.190  
Basque Country -0.892 0.279 *** -0.030 0.347  -1.359 0.675 * 
La Rioja 0.145 0.576  -0.648 0.659  2.128 1.782  
_Constant -2.549 0.327 *** 0.714 0.445 * -0.500 0.666  
Gamma variance 17.926 1.591 *** 20.048 1.165 *** 62.170 6.006 *** 
χ
2
 (Prob> χ
2
) 24958.4 (0.000) 29712.5 (0.000) 28527.9 (0.000) 
Observations (indiv.-spell) 325735 242858 261819 
Log Likelihood function -16770.34 -18608.968 -11267.143 
Notes: Regressions also include dummies for each month of beginning each temporary employment 
spells (dummy variables for January-February, March-April, May-June, July-August and September-
October). “tvc” means time varying covariate. Source: Social Security records, except for the regional 
unemployment rate and the and the quarterly GDP growth rate (which has been obtained from the 
Spanish Labour Force Survey, EPA). χ
2
 statistics refers to testing model with unobserved heterogeneity 
against that without. 
*** indicates significance at 1 per cent; ** indicates significance at 5 per cent; * indicates significance at 
10 per cent. 
 
 
